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CIVIL PROCEDURE²REASSESSING PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
ARKANSAS AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AFTER GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES
OPERATIONS V. BROWN, 131 S. CT. 2846 (2011) AND J. MCINTYRE
MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO, 131 S. CT. 2780 (2011).

I. INTRODUCTION
Morass,1 labyrinth,2 muddied,3 DQGD³ULGGOHZUDSSHGLQDP\VWHU\LnVLGHDQHQLJPD´4 Courts and commentators have long employed such colorful language to describe the confusing and complex arena of personaljurisdiction jurisprudence. Its persistently jumbled state prompted the Supreme Court of the United States to consider and hand down two decisions5
on personal jurisdiction in June 2011. As its first pronouncement on personal jurisdiction in more than two decades, the Court disappointed many who
have awaited a workable standard to assess the proper limits of procedural
due process in the modern commercial world. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown,6 a unanimous Court reversed a North Carolina
DSSHOODWHFRXUW¶VILQGLQJRIJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUforeign subsidiaries of
a multi-QDWLRQDO$PHULFDQWLUHPDQXIDFWXUHUGHFLGLQJWKDWWKHVXEVLGLDULHV¶
FRQWDFWVLQQRZD\UHQGHUHGWKHP³DWKRPH´LQ1RUWK&DUROLQD7 In the companion case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,8 a fractured Court
failed to SURGXFH D PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ EXW RYHUWXUQHG D 1HZ -HUVH\ FRXUW¶V
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a British company whose metalshearing machine injured a worker in the forum state.9
In the wake of Goodyear and Nicastro, Arkansas courts and practitioners have begun to grapple with their proper interpretation, as well as their
1. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (³It is quite
impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases [on personal jurisdiction]; we must
step from tuft to tuft across the morass.´).
2. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 531 (1995).
3. Packerware Corp. v. B & R Plastics, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D. Kan. 1998)
(referring to stream-of-commerce theory).
4. Donatelli v. Nat¶l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990).
5. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
6. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
7. Id. at 2857.
8. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
9. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2788±91 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito,
concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 2791±94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, dissented. Id. at 2794±95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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precedential value, especially within the context of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign10 manufacturer. In a case of first impression, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas provided an overview of Goodyear EXW WKH ³DW-KRPH´
test factored little into its decision.11 Similarly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on existing precedent instead
of Goodyear to decide its only post-Goodyear case to date.12 Neither the
Arkansas courts nor the Eighth Circuit have yet had the occasion to consider
the implications of Nicastro on existing specific-jurisdiction jurisprudence.
But when confronted with the case, the Eighth Circuit will have to reconcile
its precedent with the Nicastro plurality, as they stand in direct conflict with
each other.
While it is clear that the personal-jurisdiction landscape is evolving in
Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit, the question remains as to the extent of that
evolution following Goodyear and Nicastro.13 This note will provide insight
into that answer, assessing the current applications of Goodyear and the
potential impact²if any²Nicastro may have.
Part I of this note will provide an overview of the modern-day minimum-contacts test, fRFXVLQJ RQ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V JHQHUDO-jurisdiction
jurisprudence leading up to and including Goodyear, as well as its specificjurisdiction jurisprudence within the context of the stream-of-commerce
analysis following Asahi Metal Industry, Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County14 and Nicastro.15 Part II will examine both the Supreme
Court of Arkansas¶s DQG WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V GHQLDORI JHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ
over foreign manufacturers and the impact of Goodyear, arguing that its
effect is minimal DQG VHUYHV SULPDULO\ WR UHDIILUP WKH FRXUWV¶ QDUURZ FRnstruction of general jurisdiction.16 This part will conclude by examining the
(LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V SUH-Nicastro stream-of-commerce precedent and other ju10. This note uses the word ³foreign´ to mean a country other than the United States,
although it can also mean a non-resident of a particular state.
11. Yanmar Co. Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439.
12. Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir.
2011).
13. The issue of piercing the corporate veil of a foreign-parent company based on its
subsidiaries¶ activities in the forum state for the purposes of conferring general jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this note. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue in Goodyear because it had not been argued in the prior proceedings and had not been raised in the parents¶
brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011). As such, the
Eighth Circuit¶s precedent remains unaffected. See Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 596±97 (8th Cir.
2011) (reiterating the circuit court¶s alter-ego test for personal jurisdiction based on the activities of a nonresident corporation¶s in-state subsidiary without reference to Goodyear). The
Supreme Court of Arkansas similarly relied on the Eighth Circuit¶s existing test in its most
recent consideration of the issue. See Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 11±13, 386 S.W.3d at 447±48.
14. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
15. See infra Part II.A±C.
16. See infra Part III.A±B.
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ULVGLFWLRQV¶WUHDWPHQWRINicastro, noting that lower courts have significantly
tempered the impact of the plurality opinion.17 Finally, this note closes by
arguing that the Eighth Circuit should follow the trend among other jurisdictions and continue to adhere to its pre-Nicastro, pure stream-of-commerce
precedent, as it best comports with the realities of global commerce while
remaining faithful to the fairness principles at the core of personal jurisdiction doctrine.18
II. BACKGROUND
3HUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV WKH FRXUW¶V SRZHU WR HQWHU MXGJPHQW DJDLQVW D
particular defendant.19 Historically, this power derived from territorial
ERXQGDULHVPHDQLQJDFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDODXWKRULW\H[WHQGHGRQO\WRSHrsons and property within the state in which the court sat.20 The increasing
mobility of American society, however, necessitated an expansion of the
limited jurisdictional bases. Today, personal jurisdiction is limited only by
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and state long-arm
statutes, which authorize jurisdiction in a particular forum.21
Modern constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction originate
from International Shoe v. Washington.22 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court established that a state court could assert personal jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant based upon its having minimum contacts with the
forum state.23 In other words, although a defendant does not reside in the
forum state, it may conduct activities there, and those activities, in turn, may
create a substantial relationship with the state such that it subjects itself to
WKHFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ 6R ORQJ DVWKRVH PLQLPXP FRQWDFWV H[LVW KDOLQJ D
GHIHQGDQW LQWR FRXUW GRHV QRW RIIHQG ³WUDGLWLRQDO QRWLRQV RI IDLU SOD\ DQG
VXEVWDQWLDOMXVWLFH´24
While International Shoe¶V minimum-contacts test provides the basic
framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction, the Court has since developed other factors germane to its proper application; chief among them is
the purposeful-availment requirement. Thus, the nonresident defendant must
FRPPLW³VRPHDFWE\ZKLFK>LW@SXUSRVHIXlly avails itself of the privilege of
17. See infra Part III.C±D.
18. See infra Part III.E.
19. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 71 (10th ed. 2009).
20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722±24 (1877). Pennoyer also established that consent and personal service within the forum are appropriate bases for exercising personal jurisdiction. Id. at 720.
21. Friedenthal, supra note 19.
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Id. at 319±20.
24. Id. at 316.
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conducting activities within the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and
SURWHFWLRQVRILWVODZV´25 The purposeful-availment requirement focuses on
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGHOLEHUDWHDFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHHQsuring that it
ZLOOQRWEHKDOHGLQWRFRXUWDVDUHVXOWRI³µUDQGRP¶µIRUWXLWRXV¶RUµDWWHQuDWHG¶FRQWDFWV´26 7KXVZKHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGHOLEHUDWHDFWLRQVJLYHULVHWR
its connection with the forum state, jurisdiction over the defendant is generally proper.27
(YHQ LI WKH GHIHQGDQW KDV WKH UHTXLVLWH PLQLPXP FRQWDFWV ³IDLU SOD\
DQGVXEVWDQWLDOMXVWLFH´FRQWHPSODWHWKDWH[HUWLQJSHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQPD\
still be improper if it would be unfair or unreasonable to the defendant.28
The Court has recognized a number of considerations pertinent to that inTXLU\LQFOXGLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQDGMXGLFDWLQJWKHFDVHWKHSDUWLHV¶Lnterests in proceeding with the case in a particular forum and obtaining relief,
WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ SURYLGLQJ D IRUXP IRU UHGUHVV for its citizens and
providing efficient resolution of controversies, the burden upon the defendDQWLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKHVXLWLQWKHIRUXPDQGWKHVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWLQIXUWKHULQJ
essential social policies.29 Balancing these fairness factors against the defendDQW¶VPLQLPXPFRQWDFWVSURWHFWVWKHGHIHQGDQWIURPOLWLJDWLQJLQDGLstant or inconvenient forum in violation of due process.
International Shoe also laid the groundwork for the splintering of personal jurisdiction into two branches: specific and general jurisdiction.30
*HQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLVEDVHGRQWKH³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´FRQWDFWVRI
the defendant apart from the subject of the litigation, whereas specific jurisGLFWLRQ UHTXLUHV WKH VXEMHFW RI WKH OLWLJDWLRQ WR DULVH RXW RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
contacts with the forum state.31 Complicating matters further, specific jurisdiction has spawned a unique subset of cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson,32 WKH&RXUWUHFRJQL]HGWKDWDIRUXP³GRHVQRWH[FHHGLWVSRZHUV
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expec25. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
26. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475±76 (1985) (citing Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
27. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475±76.
28. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan J., dissenting) (quoting ,QW¶O
Shoe, 326 U.S. 310).
29. Id. at 300±01.
30. ,QW¶O6KRH, 326 U.S. at 317, 319 (Brennan J., dissenting); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8±9 (1984). The Helicopteros Court adopted
the terminology from Arthur von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman¶s influential article, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136±45 (1966).
31. Int¶l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 319.
32. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
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WDWLRQWKDWWKH\ZLOOEHSXUFKDVHGE\FRQVXPHUVLQWKHIRUXPVWDWH´33 This
stream-of-commerce branch of specific jurisdiction is particularly applicable
to products-liability cases, in which it is used to assess the indirect, but actual, contacts of a foreign manufacturer that uses a distribution chain to disseminate its goods in the United States.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, has
struggled to define the constitutional contours of general and specific jurisdiction, especially with regard to stream-of-commerce theory. This section
traces the ongoing evolution of both general jurisdiction34 and the stream-ofcommerce branch of specific jurisdiction,35 FXOPLQDWLQJ ZLWK WKH &RXUW¶V
latest attempts to clarify their proper constitutional scope in Goodyear36 and
Nicastro.37
A.

7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V*HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ-XULVSUXGHQFH%HIRUHGoodyear

As noted previously, the e[HUFLVH RI JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV ³GLVSXWHEOLQG´PHDQLQJWKDWLWLVSUHPLVHGRQWKHQDWXUHDQGTXDOLW\RIWKHGHIHQdDQW¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH IRUXP VWDWH ZLWKRXW UHJDUG WR WKH XQGHUO\LQJ
claim.38 In International Shoe, Justice Brennan posited what subsequently
became the amorphous test for general jurisdiction, namely whether the deIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVZLWKWKHIRUXPDUH³VRVXEVWDQWLDODQGRIVXFKDQDWXUHDV
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from thosHDFWLYLWLHV´39 Since International Shoe, the Court has had
RQO\ WZR RFFDVLRQV WR DSSO\ DQG LQWHUSUHW WKH ³FRQWLQXRXV DQG V\VWHPDWLF
FRQWDFWV´WHVWIRUJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ 40 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company,41 it considered whether an Ohio court could properly exercise general jurisdiction over a company based in the Philippines, and in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,42 it considered whether
33. Id. at 297±98.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See infra Part II.D.
38. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 610
(1988).
39. Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex.
Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921)).
40. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011)
(acknowledging that since International Shoe, the Court has considered twice whether an outof-state corporate defendant¶s in-state contacts were sufficiently continuous and systematic to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts).
41. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
42. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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a Texas court could maintain general jurisdiction over a Columbian company. The two cases would come to represent extreme opposite ends of the
general jurisdiction spectrum, leaving lower courts to consider cases in the
middle with little guidance as to what contacts warrant exerting general jurisdiction.
1.

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952).

In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court relied on the
GHIHQGDQW¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH IRUXP VWDWH RI 2KLR WR XSKROG WKH H[HUFLVH RI
general jurisdiction.43 Mrs. Perkins, a stockholder in the defendant mining
company, sued in Ohio to recover dividends owed to her and damages for
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VIDLOXUHWRLVVXHKHUVWRFNFHUWLILFDWHV44 Benguet Mining maintained its facilities in the Philippines but had ceased its operations due to the
Japanese occupation of the islands during World War II. 45 During the occuSDWLRQKRZHYHUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHVLGHQWUHWXUQHGKRPHWR2KLRDQGFRnWLQXHGWRFRQGXFWEXVLQHVVWKHUHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEHKDOI46 From the Ohio
office, the company president corresponded with employees and others regarding company business, issued paychecks, setup and used two bank accounts in Ohio for the company, worked with an Ohio-based transfer agent
IRUFRPSDQ\VWRFNKHOGGLUHFWRUV¶PHHWLQJVDQGVXSHUYLVHGDQGSDLGIRUWKH
rHKDELOLWDWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURSHUWLHVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV47
Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the company president
³FDUULHG RQ LQ 2KLR D FRQWLQXRXV DQG V\VWHPDWLF VXSHUYLVLRQ RI WKH QHFHsVDULO\OLPLWHGZDUWLPHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHFRPSDQ\´48 Despite the lack of comSDQ\SURSHUW\LQWKHVWDWHWKH&RXUWUHDVRQHG³PDQ\RILWVZDUWLPHDFWLYities were directed from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of
LWVSUHVLGHQWLQWKDW>V@WDWHDWWKHWLPHKHZDVVHUYHGZLWKVXPPRQV´49 Thus,
while LQFRUSRUDWHG DEURDG WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ORFDWLRQ DQG DFWLYLWLHV LQ 2KLR
during the war persuaded the Court that personal jurisdiction comported
with due process.50

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
Id.
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Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984).

More than three decades later, the Supreme Court expressly labeled the
theoretical underpinnings of Perkins DV ³JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´51 In
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Court assessed the
contacts of a Columbia-based helicopter transportation corporation
³+HOLFRO´ ZLWKWKHIRUXPVWDWHRI7H[DVZKHUHVXUYLYRUVDQGGHFHGHQWVRI
a Peruvian helicopter crash brought a wrongful-death action seeking to recover from the corporation as the owner of the helicopter involved in the
accident.52 Using Perkins as a \DUGVWLFNWKH&RXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDW+HOLFRO¶V
FRQWDFWVZLWK7H[DVGLGQRWFRQVWLWXWHWKHW\SHRI³V\VWHPDWLFDQGFRQWLQuRXVFRQWDFWV´QHFHVVDU\WRH[HUFLVHJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ53
7KH&RXUWHQXPHUDWHG+HOLFRO¶VFRQWDFWVDVWKHIROORZLQJGLVSDWFKLQJ
its CEO to Houston for a single contract-negotiation meeting; purchasing
substantial amounts of equipment, helicopters, and training services from a
Fort Worth-based company; depositing checks drawn on a Houston bank;
and sending personnel to Fort Worth for training purposes.54 The Court disPLVVHGWKH&(2¶VORQHWULSWR7H[DVDVLQVXIILFLHQWO\FRQWLQXRXVRUV\VWHmatic in nature.55 Similarly, the Court considered the checks drawn on the
+RXVWRQ EDQN RI ³QHJOLJLEOH VLJQLILFDQFH´ ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH ORFDWLRQ RI WKH
bank is a matter left to the discretion of the payee, and Helicol had no control over the matter.56 7KH&RXUWUHDVRQHG³VXFKXQLODWHUDODFWLYLW\RIDQRWher party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum [s]tate to justiI\ DQ DVVHUWLRQ RI MXULVGLFWLRQ´57 7KH &RXUW DOVR GLVPLVVHG +HOLFRO¶V SXrchases within Texas despite the fact that it spent more than $4 million over a
seven-year period, buying approximately eighty percent of its fleet within
the forum.58 Although the purchases were substantial and regular, the Court
UHOLHG RQ D SUHYLRXV FDVH WR FRQFOXGH WKDW ³SXUFKDVHV DQG UHODWHG WULSV
standLQJDORQHDUHQRWDVXIILFLHQWEDVLVIRUD>V@WDWH¶VDVVHUWLRQRIMXULVGLcWLRQ´59 SimLODUO\WKH&RXUWGHFLGHGWKDWWKHEULHISUHVHQFHRI+HOLFRO¶VHmployees in Texas for training purposes did not sufficiently enhance the na-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417 (citing Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
Id. at 411, 417±18.
Id. at 417 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
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ture of its contacts so that the Texas courts could exercise general jurisdiction.60
Taken together, Perkins and Helicopteros represent opposite points at
the ends of the general jurisdiction spectrum. In Perkins, general jurisdiction
comported with due-process principles because the Philippines-based company essentially had its principal place of business in Ohio during World
War II.61 In contrast, Helicopteros established that mere sales within the
forum state, although regular and substantial, are not enough to warrant general jurisdiction.62 Between these two points, however, lower courts had
little guidance in assessing the nature and quality of contacts that meet the
³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´WKUHVKROGIRUJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ
B.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011).

In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court attempted to close the general-jurisdiction gap posed by Perkins and
Helicopteros. The case arose from a bus accident in France in which two
thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina were killed.63 7KHER\V¶SDUHQWV
brought an action for damages in a North Carolina state court against Goodyear USA and three of its subsidiaries, operating in Turkey, France, and
Luxembourg, alleging that a defective tire manufactured in Turkey caused
the deadly accident.64 Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction, as it conceded that it maintained plants in the state and regularly conducted business
there.65 The foreign subsidiaries, however, challenged the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the trial court.66
The trial court, and then the North Carolina Court of Appeals, held that
the contacts between the foreign subsidiaries and the forum state were suffiFLHQWO\³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´IRUWKHVWDWH¶VFRXUWVWRDVVHUWMXULVGLction.67 7KH IRUHLJQ VXEVLGLDULHV¶ FRQWDFWV FRQVLVWHG RI GLVWULEXWLQJ WHQV RI
thousands (out of tens of millions) of tires in North Carolina through other
Goodyear USA affiliates.68 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned
WKDW WKH IRUHLJQ VXEVLGLDULHV WKURXJK *RRG\HDU¶V ³highly-organized distribution process´ VXEPLWWHG WR WKH FRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ E\ putting their tires
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 418.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447±49 (1952).
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2851±52.
Id. at 2852.
Id.
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into the stream of commerce without attempting to limit or confine sales
within North Carolina.69 Furthermore, the court asserted that the state had a
legitimate interest in providing a forum for the plaintiffs because traveling to
France to litigate the action constituted a considerable hardship.70 The North
Carolina Supreme Court declined discretionary review.71
In reversing, a unanimous Supreme Court offered a broad opinion in an
attempt to reiterate the proper demarcation between specific and general
jurisdiction, as well as to clarify the scope of general jurisdiction. Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, began by distinguishing between the two
theories of personal jurisdiction, as articulated in International Shoe and
then later refined by Helicopteros.72 She noted that the North Carolina courts
KDG EOXUUHG WKH OLQH EHWZHHQ ³DOO SXUSRVH´ JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG ³FDVHOLQNHG´ VSHFLILF MXULVGLFWLRQ73 She then emphasized that stream-ofFRPPHUFH WKHRU\ RU WKH IORZ RI D PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V Sroducts into a forum
VWDWHLVFRQILQHGWRVSHFLILFMXULVGLFWLRQDQGWKDW³WLHVVHUYLQJWREROVWHUWKH
exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based
RQWKRVHWLHVWKHIRUXPKDVJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUDGHIHQGDQW´74 North
Carolina lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim because the accident occurred outside the forum and the allegedly defective tires had been
manufactured and sold abroad.75
Likewise, the Court concluded that the state courts lacked authority to
H[HUFLVH JHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ EDVHG RQWKH VDOHV RI WKH IRUHLJQ VXEVLGLDULHV¶
WLUHV ³VSRUDGLFDOO\ PDGH LQ 1RUWK &DUROLQD WKURXJK LQWHUPHGLDULHV´76 The
&RXUWOLNHQHGWKHVXEVLGLDULHV¶FRQWDFWVWRWKRVHLWGLVPLVVHGLQHelicopteros
and relied on the case further for the proposition that sales, even those occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to support the exercise of general
jurisdiction.77 As such, it concluded that the attenuated contacts between the
IRUHLJQVXEVLGLDULHVDQGWKHIRUXPVWDWH³>IHOO@ IDUVKRUWRIWKHµWKHFRQWLQuRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLFJHQHUDOEXVLQHVVFRQWDFWV¶QHFHVVDU\WRHPSRZHU1RUWK
Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that
FRQQHFWVWKHPWRWKH>V@WDWH´78 Furthermore, in a footnote, the Court rebutted the fairness reasoning asserted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
QRWLQJWKDWJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLVQRWSUHPLVHGRQWKHSODLQWLII¶VLQWHUHVWVEXW
69. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852±53 (citing Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009)).
70. Id. at 2853 (citing Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2853±54.
73. Id. at 2849.
74. Id.
75. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
76. Id. at 2856.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2857.
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UDWKHUWKHSODLQWLII¶VUHVLGHQFHLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHLVJHUPDQHRQO\WRVSHFLILF
jurisdiction.79
In reversing, the Court articulated the proper test for analyzing when
general jurisdiction may be warranted²when the contacts of a foreign corSRUDWLRQDUH³VRµFRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF¶DVWRUHQGHUWKHPHVVHQWLDOO\at
home LQWKHIRUXPVWDWH´80 Justice Ginsburg did not expressly define when a
FRUSRUDWLRQLVSURSHUO\FRQVLGHUHG³DWKRPH´IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIVXEMHFWLQJ
it to adjudicatory authority. She did, however, note that Perkins ³UHPDLQV
[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a
IRUHLJQFRUSRUDWLRQWKDWKDVQRWFRQVHQWHGWRVXLWLQWKHIRUXP´81 In comparLVRQVKHDVVHUWHGWKDW³XQOLNHWKHGHIHQGDQWLQPerkins, whose sole wartime
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home
LQ1RUWK&DUROLQD´82
C.

Specific Jurisdiction Prior to Nicastro

As noted in Goodyear, specific jurisdiction encompasses the bulk of
WKH&RXUW¶VSHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQMXULVSUXGHQFH83 In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is predicated on the underlying cODLPLWLV³GLspute-specific, based only on affiliations between the forum and the controYHUV\´84 Although the Court has attempted to refine the contours of specific
jurisdiction numerous times, the application of the minimum-contacts test
has caused significant confusion among lower courts, leading to varied results across jurisdictions, especially in the context of the stream-ofcommerce theory.85 Much of the confusion in this area stems from the divided opinion of the Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County.86

79. Id. at 2857 n.5.
80. Id. at 2851 (emphasis added) (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
317 (1945)).
81. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (citing Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
82. Id. at 2857.
83. Id. at 2854 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Cal. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
84. See Twitchell, supra note 38.
85. See Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain¶t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U.
L. REV. 681, 703±04 (2009) (collecting cases demonstrating the split among circuit courts on
the appropriate stream-of-commerce test).
86. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
County, the Court sought to clarify whether stream-of-commerce theory
could support the exercise of personal jurisdiction when a product is sold
indirectly in the forum state. The case arose out of a motorcycle accident,
which caused significant injury to the driver and killed his wife, a passenger
on the bike.87 The driver, Gary Zurcher, filed suit in California, alleging
GHIHFWVLQWKHPRWRUF\FOH¶VWLUHWXEHDQGVHDODQWFDXVHGKLPWRORVHFRQWURO
of the vehicle.88 Among the defendants were Zurcher, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, and Cheng 6KLQ 5XEEHU ,QGXVWULDO &RPSDQ\ ³&KHQJ
6KLQ´ 89 In turn, Cheng Shin cross-complained seeking indemnification
from its co-defendants, including Asahi Metal, the manufacturer of the
WXEH¶V YDOYH90 Although Zurcher settled with the various defendants, the
indemnity action against Asahi proceeded through the California courts.91
$VDKL¶VVDOHVWR&KHQJ6KLQRFFXUUHGDEURDGDQGFRQVLVWHGRIDWOHDVW
100,000 units annually over a five-year period.92 Cheng Shin acknowledged
that California constituted approximately twenty percent of its sales in the
United States.93 Because Asahi knew that the valves it placed into the stream
of commerce through Cheng Shin would eventually find their way to California, the California courts found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comported with due process.94
In reversing, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the California
courts lacked personal jurisdiction but disagreed on the proper stream-ofcommerce test.95 -XVWLFH2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGE\WKUHHRWKHUMXVWLFHVUHDVRQHG
thDWWKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHGHPDQGV³VRPHWKLQJ PRUH´WKDQPHUHDZDUeness that a product may reach the forum state through the stream of commerce.96 She reasoned that the minimum contacts needed to support the assertion of jurisdiction must arise from the defeQGDQW¶VDFWVWKDWSXUSRVHIXOO\
target the forum state.97 7KH³VRPHWKLQJPRUH´QHHGHGWRHYLQFHSXUSRVHIXO
87. Id. at 105.
88. Id. at 105±06.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 110±11.
95. Compare id. at 108±13 (O¶Conner, J., focusing on the ³substantial connection´ of
minimum contacts´) with id. at 116±21 (Brennan, J., determining that defendant¶s actions,
not its expectations, empower a state¶s courts to exercise jurisdiction.).
96. Id. at 111.
97. Id. at 112.
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DYDLOPHQW PD\ LQFOXGH³GHVLJQLQJ WKHSURGXFW IRU WKH PDUNHW LQ WKH IRUXP
[s]tate, advertising in the forum [s]tate, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum [s]tate, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum
>V@WDWH´98
Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices, strenuously disagreed
ZLWKWKLV³VWUHDP-of-commerce-SOXVWHVW´99 Justice Brennan argued that the
Due Process Clause is satisfied when a manufacturer makes predictable
sales through a distribution chain that sweeps its products into the forum
state.100 +HDVVHUWHGWKDW³>D@VORQJDVDSDUWLFLSDQWLQthis process is aware
that the final product is being marketed in the forum [s]tate, the possibility
RIDODZVXLWWKHUHFDQQRWFRPHDVDVXUSULVH´101 Thus, Justice Brennan conFOXGHGWKDW$VDKL¶VV\VWHPDWLFDQGVXEVWDQWLDOVDOHVRIWKHYDOYHFRPSRQHQW
to Cheng Shin, coupled with its knowledge that Cheng Shin made regular
sales of the final product in California, constituted sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction.102
While the justices disagreed as to the appropriate stream-of-commerce
test, they unanimously agreed that exercising personal jurisdiction over
$VDKLGLGQRWFRPSRUWZLWK³WUDGLWLRQDOQRWLRQVRIIDLUSOD\DQGVXEVWDQWLDO
MXVWLFH´103 Assessing the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction
required evaluating the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
VWDWH WKH SODLQWLII¶V LQWHUHVW LQ REWDLQLQJ UHOLHI WKH LQWHUVWDWH MXGLFLDO V\sWHP¶VLQWHUHVWLQREWDLQLQJWKHPRVWHIILFLHQWUHVROXWLRQRIFRQWURYHUVLHVDQG
WKH FROOHFWLYH VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQ IXrthering substantive social policies.104
Applying these factors, the Court found that the burden on Asahi of defending in a foreign legal system far outweighed the interests of the forum state
and the interests of the plaintiff, who had already obtained relief, leaving
just the indemnity action, which stemmed from a transaction abroad.105
Moreover, the Court cautioned that the potential international ramifications
of asserting personal jurisdiction militated against its exercise.106 Aside from
the minimum-contacts question then, all nine justices agreed that it would be
unreasonable and unfair for California to assert personal jurisdiction over
Asahi.107
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 113 (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 114±16.
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In the wake of Asahi, lower courts struggled with the appropriate
stream-of-commerce test to adopt and apply.108 Some committed to Justice
2¶&RQQRU¶VVWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test, while others adhered to the pure
stream-of-commerce test as articulated by Justice Brennan.109 Adding to the
MXPEOHDWOHDVWRQHFRXUWXWLOL]HGWKHIDFWRUVLQ-XVWLFH6WHYHQ¶VRSLQLRQWR
analyze the minimum-contacts question.110 Undoubtedly, this state of perpetual confusion and inconsistency prompted the United States Supreme
Court to reconsider and resolve the issue of when stream-of-commerce theory supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
D.

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro111 presented the Court with the
opportunity for resolution. The case involved a workplace accident in which
Robert Nicastro lost four of his fingers when his hand became entangled in a
metal-shearing machine.112 Although the accident occurred in New Jersey,
Nicastro brought a products-OLDELOLW\DFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHPDFKLQH¶VPDQXIDcturer, J. McIntyre Machinery, which was incorporated in England.113 The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state could exercise personal jurisGLFWLRQRYHU-0F,QW\UHUHO\LQJLQSDUWRQ-XVWLFH%UHQQDQ¶VSXUHVWUHDPof-commerce theory in Asahi.114 The court surmised that the company used
an independent distributor in the United States to sell its machinery; its
leadership attended annual scrap metal conventions to promote its product,
although not in New Jersey; four machines ended up in New Jersey; it held
patents on its recycling technology in the United States; and the distributor
FRQGXFWHG LWV DGYHUWLVLQJ DQG VDOHV LQ DFFRUG ZLWK - 0F,QW\UH¶V GLUHFWLRQ
when possible.115 Because of these contacts, the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that the manufacturer knew or should have reasonably known
that its products, sold through a highly organized distribution system, would
reach the forum state, and, therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
did not offend due process.116

108. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 210 (2011).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
112. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2785 (citing Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 591±92
(N.J. 2010)).
115. Id. at 2786.
116. Id.

242

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

A majority of the United States Supreme Court disagreed but also disagreed as to why.117 Ironically, Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, began
E\DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³>WKH@&RXUW¶VAsahi decision may be responsible in
SDUW IRU >WKH 1HZ -HUVH\ 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V@ HUURU UHJDUGLQJ WKH VWUHDP RI
FRPPHUFH´DQGWKDWNicastro SUHVHQWHG³DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRSURYLGH greater
FODULW\´118 +H WKHQ SURFHHGHG WR RXWULJKW UHMHFW -XVWLFH %UHQQDQ¶V FRQFXrrence in Asahi, as it made foreseeability, without more, the touchstone of
personal jurisdiction.119 -XVWLFH.HQQHG\UHDVRQHG³WKDWLWLVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
actions, not his expectDWLRQVWKDWHPSRZHUD>V@WDWH¶VFRXUWVWRVXEMHFWKLP
WRMXGJPHQW´120 For the plurality, purposeful availment most closely resemEOHG -XVWLFH 2¶&RQQRU¶V VWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test in Asahi.121 Justice
Kennedy concluded that courts may properly assert personal jurisdiction
EDVHG RQ D FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V VDOH RI JRRGV ³RQO\ ZKHUH WKH GHIHQGDQW FDQ EH
VDLGWRKDYHWDUJHWHGWKHIRUXP´122 Pursuant to this reasoning, Justice Kennedy had little difficulty holding that J. McIntyre had not purposefully targeted New Jersey.123 Instead, he asserted that the facts demonstrated a general intent to serve the U.S. market but not the New Jersey market in particular.124 Absent activities specifically targeting the forum state, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre violated due process.125
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment but
UHMHFWHG WKH SOXUDOLW\¶V ³VWULFW QR-MXULVGLFWLRQ UXOH´126 He reasoned that the
case did not necessitate fashioning a new approach and expressed concern
WKDWWKHSOXUDOLW\¶VUXOHPD\XOWLPDWHO\SURYHXQZRUNDEOHLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
modern, Internet-based commerce.127 Instead, Justice Breyer would have
UHYHUVHGWKH1HZ-HUVH\6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQEDVHGRQH[LVWLQJSUHFedent exclusively.128 He reasoned that the facts did not establish a regular
flow of sales or goods into the forum state, a necessary finding under a pure
stream-of-commerce analysis.129 Similarly, the record revealed no additional
activity, such as advertising, special design features, or advice to consumers
117. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785±91 (plurality opinion); Id. at 2791±94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
118. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 2788±89.
120. Id. at 2789.
121. Id. at 2788.
122. Id.
123. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2791.
126. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. Id. at 2792±93.
128. Id.
129. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792±93.
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ZLWKLQ 1HZ -HUVH\ WKXV KH GHHPHG DEVHQW WKH ³VRPHWKLQJ PRUH´ QHHGHG
under the stream-of-commerce-plus test.130 Because Nicastro failed to show
that J. McIntyre made a specific effort to sell in New Jersey, or that it put its
goods into the stream of commerce expecting them to be purchased by New
Jersey consumers, Justice Breyer found the exercise of jurisdiction improper.131
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, strongly disagreed with the
six justices who concluded that New Jersey improperly exercised personal
jurisdiction.132 6KH DGPRQLVKHG WKHP IRU ³WXUQ>LQJ@ WKH FORFN EDFN WR WKH
days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being
haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands
RIDSURGXFWE\KDYLQJLQGHSHQGHQWGLVWULEXWRUVPDUNHWLW´133 According to
KHUDVVHVVPHQWRI-0F,QW\UH8.¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQFOXGLQJ
its purposeful engagement of the American distributor, Justice Ginsburg
would have upheld the New JersH\6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDVVHUWLRQRIMXULVGLFWLRQ
EDVHGRQWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VWDUJHWHGHIIRUWVDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVPDUNHWDVD
whole.134 6KHUHDVRQHGWKDW³WKHPDFKLQHDUULYHGLQ1LFDVWUR¶V1HZ-HUVH\
workplace not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and distribution system that [J.] McIntyre UK deliberately arUDQJHG´135
)XUWKHUPRUH-XVWLFH *LQVEXUJ¶V GLVVHQW HPSKDVL]HG WKH IDLUQHVV SULnciples inherent to the due process analysis.136 She noted that the distribution
scheme and practices employed by J. McIntyre are typical of modern commerce, in which a foreign manufacturer solicits a U.S.-based entity to advertise and sell its products anywhere customers can be found, rather than in a
specific state.137 When that product is subsequently sold and delivered into
the forum state where it injures an individual, she posited that, based on the
mode of trade employed, it would be both fair and reasonable to require the
foreign manufacturer to defend its product where the injury occurred.138 Although adamantly opposed to a jurisdictional rule whereby an international
seller could avoid jurisdiction simply by engaging an independent American
distributor, Justice Ginsburg seemingly found solace in the fractured reasonLQJRIKHUIHOORZMXVWLFHV³:KLOH,GLVVHQWIURPWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW,WDNH
130. Id. at 2792.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2794±95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2795 (citing Russell Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1995)).
134. Id.
135. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2800.
137. Id. at 2799.
138. Id. at 2800.

244

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion
ZRXOGWDNHDJLDQWVWHSDZD\IURPWKHµQRWLRQVRIIDLUSOD\DQGVXEVWDQWLDO
MXVWLFH¶XQGHUO\LQJInternational Shoe´139
III. ARGUMENT
Against this backdrop, courts and practitioners in Arkansas and the
Eighth Circuit alike are attempting to discern the impact, if any, Goodyear
and Nicastro have on existing precedent. To date, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit have had a single opportunity in which to
assess the meaning and impact of Goodyear on their respective generaljurisdiction jurisprudence.140 7KLV VHFWLRQ QRWHV WKDW WKH ³DW-KRPH´ WHVW KDV
WKXVIDUIDFWRUHGOLWWOHLQWRWKHFRXUWV¶ analyses; instead, general jurisdiction
in Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit remains a fact-intensive inquiry, with
FRXUWV ZHLJKLQJ WKH QXPEHU DQG QDWXUH RI D GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQWDFWV WR GHWHrPLQHZKHWKHUWKH\DUHVXIILFLHQWO\³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´7ZRFases
recently considered by the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit have honed in on the overall import of Goodyear²that courts should
reserve general jurisdiction for exceptional circumstances²without attributing much significance to whether D IRUHLJQ GHIHQGDQW LV ³DW KRPH´141
Goodyear, therefore, has done little to affect the way in which practitioners
should approach general jurisdiction or the way courts analyze it.
On the other hand, Nicastro has the potential to completely overhaul
existing precedent in the Eighth Circuit. While Arkansas is devoid of
stream-of-commerce case law, Eighth Circuit precedent stands in direct contrast to the Nicastro plurality: the Eighth Circuit subjects foreign manufacturers142 at the head of domestic distribution systems to personal jurisdiction
when they target markets as a whole, as opposed to a specific state. Despite
this conflict, however, this note concludes that the Eighth Circuit need not²
and should not²depart from precedent. First, the Nicastro plurality¶VRSLnion is not binding precedent. Indeed, in those jurisdictions that have considered NicastroDQHPHUJLQJPDMRULW\KDVOLPLWHGWKHFDVH¶VSUHFHGHQWLDOYDlue and continues to adhere to their pre-Nicastro approaches.143 Second, and
more significantly, the (LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VFXUUHQWSUHFHGHQWEHWWHUUHIOHFWVWKH
139. Id. at 2804.
140. Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir.
2011); Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439.
141. See infra Part III.A±B.
142. This note focuses on end-product manufacturers, as opposed to component-part
manufacturers. See generally Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful
Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41 (2012) (describing the difference between end-product manufacturers and component-part manufacturers).
143. See infra Part III.D.
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realities of modern global commerce, in which foreign manufacturers rely
on domestic distributors to sell their merchandise to as many consumers as
possible without regard to state borders. Thus, a framework that relies on
specific state targeting, such as the Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶VLVRXWPRGHGLQWoGD\¶V FRPPHUFLDO ZRUOG )LQDOO\ WKLV QRWH FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH (LJKWK &LrFXLW¶VFXUUHQWDSSURDFKLVWKHEHWWHUDSSURDFKEDVHGRQWKHSROLF\FRQVLGHUations underlying personal jurisdiction jurisprudence²purposeful availment,
fairness, and reciprocity.
A.

7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI$UNDQVDV¶V*HQHUDO-Jurisdiction Analysis Before and After Goodyear

The power of the Arkansas courts to exert personal jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants expanded significantly with the passage of Act 486
of 1995.144 $FWRYHUKDXOHGWKHVWDWH¶VORQJ-arm statute, which previously confined personal jurisdiction to specific cases, such as those in which the
cause of action arose from thH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH VWDWH WKRVH
where the defendant contracted for goods or services in the state, and those
in which the defendant committed a tort in the state.145 Act 486 removed
these categorical limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, effectively
³FRQYHUW>LQJ@$UNDQVDVLQWRDJHQHUDO-jurisdiction state for purposes of perVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´146 Now, the long arm statute broadly provides that ArNDQVDV FRXUWV KDYH SHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU SDUWLHV³WR WKH PD[LPXP Hxtent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth AmendPHQW RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQ´147 Thus, by removing the requirePHQW WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FDXVH RI DFWLRQ DULVH IURP LWV FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH
state, Arkansas now exercises general jurisdiction to the extent authorized
by the Due Process Clause.148
Since the passage of Act 486, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has sparingly considered the due process limits of general jurisdiction.149 In those
cases, it has employed a fact-intensive inquiry, weighing the quantity and
TXDOLW\ RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQWDFWV DJDLQVW WKH ³SUHFLRXV OLWWOH DXWKRULW\´ 150
144. Act of Feb. 28, 1995, No. 486, 1995 Ark. Acts 486 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-4-101(Repl. 2010)).
145. Davis v. St. John¶s Health Sys., Inc., 348 Ark. 17, 22±23, 71 S.W.3d 55, 57±58
(2002).
146. Id. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59.
147. ARK. CODE ANN. §16-4-101(B) (Repl. 2010).
148. Davis, 348 Ark. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59.
149. See Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238, 247±49, 234 S.W.3d
838, 844±45 (2006); Volunteer Transp., Inc. v. House, 357 Ark. 95, 100±02, 162 S.W.3d
456, 458±60 (2004); Davis, 348 Ark. at 25±27, 71 S.W.3d at 59±61; John Norrell Arms, Inc.
v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).
150. Davis, 348 Ark. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59.
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provided by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a result, the court
has regularly declined to confer general jurisdiction based on insufficient
contacts.151 Where it has found general jurisdiction proper, the defendant
had a substantial presence in the state, including having an agent for service
of process, employees, and property in Arkansas, as well as being qualified
to do business in the state and conducting business in the state through
wholly-owned subsidiaries.152
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has decided one case based on general
jurisdiction post-Goodyear. In Yanmar Company v. Slater,153 the plaintiff
asserted various tort claims against the Japanese manufacturer of a tractor
that killed her husband, Rudy Slater.154 In a matter of first impression, the
FRXUWKHOGWKDW$UNDQVDV¶VH[HUFLVHRIJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQYLRODWHGGXHSUocess, applying Goodyear but relying primarily on the fact-intensive contacts
inquiry to reach its result.155
Yanmar manufactured the tractor at issue in 1977 and sold it to an authorized Yanmar distributor in Japan.156 ,Q  ZLWKRXW <DQPDU¶V
knowledge, a Vietnamese company acquired the tractor, and it subsequently
found its way into the United StaWHVWKURXJKWKH³JUD\PDUNHW´157 in 2004.158
First acquired by a Texas company, the tractor was then auctioned in Oklahoma to the dealer that ultimately sold it to Rudy Slater, more than twentysix years after its manufacture date.159 Just days after the purchase, the tractor rolled over on Mr. Slater as he mowed the grass and killed him.160
0U6ODWHU¶VZLGRZ:DQGD6ODWHUDORQJZLWKWKHFRXSOH¶VVRQILOHGD
wrongful-death action premised on various claims against Yanmar Japan,
and the companies in the long acquisition chain, as well as Yanmar America, a subsidiary of Yanmar Japan that sells parts for authorized Yanmar tractors in the United States.161 After a trial on the negligence claims, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County returned a verdict of $2.5 mil-

151. See, e.g., Ganey, 366 Ark. at 247±48, 234 S.W.3d at 844±45; John Norell Arms, 332
Ark. at 29, 962 S.W.2d at 804.
152. Davis, 348 Ark. at 26±27, 71 S.W.3d at 60±61.
153. 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439.
154. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 442.
155. Id. at 4±12, 386 S.W.3d at 443±47.
156. Id. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 442.
157. The gray market is defined as ³a market in which the seller uses legal but sometimes
unethical methods to avoid a manufacturer¶s distribution chain and thereby sell goods (especially imported goods) at prices lower than those envisioned by the manufacturer.´ BLACK¶S
LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (9th ed. 2009).
158. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 442.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 442.
161. Id. at 3±7, 386 S.W.3d at 444±45.
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lion against the defendants.162 The appeal, premised largely on Yanmar JaSDQ¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH FLUFXLW FRXUW ODFNHG MXULVGLFWLRQ UHDFKHG WKH 6upreme Court of Arkansas on certification.163
The Supreme Court of Arkansas began its analysis by reciting the applicable rule from Helicopteros³DGHIHQGDQWPD\EHVXEMHFWWRWKHIRUXP
VWDWH¶VH[HUFLVHRISHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQLIJHQHUDOO\LWVFRQWDFWVZLWKWKHVWDWH
DUH FRQWLQXRXV V\VWHPDWLF DQG VXEVWDQWLDO´164 Against this high bar, the
court determineGWKDW<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VFRQWDFWVZLWK$UNDQVDVIHOOVKRUW,W
noted that Yanmar Japan lacked authorization to conduct business in the
state and did not maintain an agent for service of process in the state.165 Further, it did not have property, offices, employees, assets, or accounts in Arkansas.166 And, while Yanmar Japan previously sold its tractors in the United States, such sales ceased in 1991.167 It did, however, continue to sell parts
in Arkansas, accumulating average annual sales of $10,000, and retained
authorized dealers in the state in addition to its Illinois-based subsidiary,
Yanmar America.168
0UV6ODWHUUHOLHGRQ<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VSDVWVDOHVDQGLWVFXUUHQWUHODWLRnship with the subsidiary as sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.169 For support, she pointed to a Supreme Court of Alabama decision reversing summary judgment for Yanmar in a similar suit over a graymarket tractor.170 In Smith v. Yanmar Diesel Engine Co.,171 the court noted
WKDW <DQPDU¶V VWLSXODWLRQ WKDW LW VHOOV SDUWV WKURXgh its distributor in Alabama made summary judgment inappropriate, as the pervasiveness of those
sales may have been enough to confer general jurisdiction.172 The Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to follow this line of reasoning based on the
unique procedural posture of the Alabama case.173 Moreover, the court believed that Smith conflicted with the reasoning of Goodyear.174 After sumPDUL]LQJWKHFDVHEXWZLWKRXWUHFLWDWLRQRUFLWDWLRQWRWKH³DWKRPH´VWDQdDUG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW RI $UNDQVDV FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³>L@W is simply not
162. Id. at 3±4, 386 S.W.3d at 442±43.
163. Id. at 4, 386 S.W.3d at 443.
164. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 7, 386 S.W.3d at 444 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415±16 (1984)).
165. Id. at 8, 386 S.W.3d at 445.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 7±8, 386 S.W.3d at 445.
169. Id. at 8±9, 386 S.W.3d at 445.
170. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 9, 386 S.W.3d at 445±46 (citing Smith v. Yanmar Diesel
Engine Co., 855 So.2d 1039, 1043 (Ala. 2003)).
171. 855 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 2003).
172. Id. at 1043.
173. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 9, 386 S.W.3d at 445±46.
174. Id. at 10±11, 386 S.W.3d at 446±47.
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enough that Yanmar Japan used to sell tractors in Arkansas or that it has a
VXEVLGLDU\ WKDW GLVWULEXWHV SDUWV LQ WKLV VWDWH´175 The court further admonLVKHGWKHFLUFXLWFRXUWIRUHQJDJLQJLQWKH³VSUDZOLQJYLHZRIJHQHUDOMXULsGLFWLRQ´UHMHFWed by the nine justices in Goodyear.176
)URPWKHIRUHJRLQJLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKH³DW-KRPH´VWDQGDUGHQXQFLDWHG
in Goodyear has had limited impact on general jurisdiction in Arkansas. In
Yanmar, the court employed a factual inquiry consistent with its previous
general jurisdiction cases and determined that Yanmar Japan had insufficient contacts with Arkansas. Taking Goodyear out of the equation, the
FRXUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VFRQWDFWVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVSUHFedent, in which it has only conferred general jurisdiction based on a substantial number of significant contacts with the state.177 Further, when compared
to the contacts considered in Helicopteros²more than $4 million in sales
over a seven-year period, training, and visits to the forum state²the quality
DQG TXDQWLW\ RI <DQPDU¶V FRQWDFWV Iell short of those rejected by the
Court.178
The Yanmar DQDO\VLVLVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH³DW-KRPH´WHVW¶VOLPLWHGXWLOity²QDPHO\ ZKDW GRHV LW PHDQ WR EH ³DW KRPH"´ 7KH GLIIHULQJ LQWHUSUHWations offered by commentatorV DUH HYLGHQFH RI WKH VWDQGDUG¶V DPRUSKRXV
nature.179 One interpretation is that the standard negates numerous lower
FRXUWV¶ILQGLQJVWKDWDFRUSRUDWLRQLVVXEMHFWWRJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQZKHUHYHU
LWLV³GRLQJEXVLQHVV´180 Another plausible reading is that a substantial volume of sales into the forum state survives Goodyear as a basis for general
jurisdiction but that a stream-of-commerce theory does not, as sporadic and
175. Id. at 11, 386 S.W.3d at 446.
176. Id. at 10, 386 S.W.3d at 446±47 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)).
177. See Davis v. St. John¶s Health Sys., Inc., 348 Ark. 17, 26±27, 71 S.W.3d 55, 60±61
(2002).
178. See supra Part II.A.2.
179. See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, ³Home´, and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 679, 692-95 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear narrowed
the scope of general jurisdiction such that it cannot be based on whether the defendant is
doing business in the forum state and suggesting that ³at home´ may be limited to one location); James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of
General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 990±91 (2012) (arguing that
Goodyear invalidated general jurisdiction based on sales in the forum, and the ³at home´
standard for general jurisdiction will entail more substantial contacts with the forum than
those considered sufficient under previous tests); Charles W. ³Rocky´ Rhodes, Nineteenth
Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV.
387, 429 (2012) (asserting that a non-resident corporation may be considered ³at home´ when
it ³performs its core supervisory functions in the state in comparable quantities to a domiciliary´); Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of ³Essentially at Home´ in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 527, 545±48 (2012) (suggesting five factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a non-resident corporation is ³at home´ in the forum state).
180. See Feder, supra note 179.
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LQGLUHFW VDOHV FDQQRW UHQGHU D FRUSRUDWLRQ ³DW KRPH´181 And, yet another
interpretation may EHWKDW³DWKRPH´QHFHVVLWDWHVDQLQTXLU\LQWRZKHWKHUWKH
non-resident defendant views itself, and is viewed by others, as a member of
the community, giving significant weight to a physical presence in the forum state.182
Most commentators agree that at the very least, the Goodyear opinion
served to narrow the scope of general jurisdiction. In that vein, perhaps the
PRVW SUDFWLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI ³DW KRPH´ LV WKDW LW LV PHUHO\ D UHVWULFWLYH
clause employed to aid lower courts in their analysis and to encourage them
to limit general jurisdiction to exceptional cases.183 This interpretation comSRUWVZLWK-XVWLFH*LQVEXUJ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRPerkins DVWKH³WH[WERRNFDVH´RI
general jurisdiction.184 Short of facts that evidence an entity principally operates in or is LQFRUSRUDWHG ZLWKLQWKH IRUXP VWDWH WKH ³DW KRPH´ VWDQGDUG
necessitates sufficiently numerous, substantial, and regular contacts by a
corporation in order to appropriately find a basis for general jurisdiction. In
this regard, the test may simply be an afILUPDWLRQ RI WKH ³FRQWLQXRXV DQG
V\VWHPDWLFFRQWDFWV´DQDO\VLVDOUHDG\HPSOR\HGE\ORZHUFRXUWV185
:KLOH³DWKRPH´LVRSHQWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHYanmar decision demonstrates that deciphering its precise meaning is unnecessary. Instead, the Supreme Court of Arkansas can and did rely on Goodyear for its overall import²that the scope of general jurisdiction is narrow. This is evident by the
FRXUW¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHODQJXDJHRIGoodyear FDXWLRQLQJDJDLQVWD³VSUDZlLQJ YLHZ RI JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´186 but not otherwise analyzing whether
<DQPDU -DSDQ FRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG DW KRPH LQ $UNDQVDV :KLOH WKH ³DW
KRPH´ WHVW PD\ FRPH WR KDYH PRUH VLJQLILFDQFH LQ D FORVHUFDVH EDVHG RQ
different facts,187 for now, the Arkansas high court seems to have confined
Goodyear to the broad proposition that general jurisdiction is to be narrowly
construed. As such, the court is likely to continue its fact-intensive analysis
RIDGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVH[LVWLQJSUHFHGHQW
181. See Peterson, supra note 108, at 216±17.
182. See Stein, supra note 179, at 543.
183. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 595 (2012) (asserting that the ³at
home´ metaphor is meant to supplement, rather than replace, the old metaphors ³of substantial activity or continuous and systematic contacts´).
184. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)
(citing Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
185. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2013).
186. Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, at 11, 386 S.W.3d 439, 447 (citing Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2856).
187. See Hoffheimer, supra note 183, at 604 (noting that a hard case may be found where
the defendant has a physical office in the forum state but does not do most of its business
within that jurisdiction).
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7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V*HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ$Qalysis Before and After
Goodyear

Like the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit employs a
fact-LQWHQVLYHLQTXLU\WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVZLWKWKH
IRUXPVWDWHDUH³VRFRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPLF´VRDVWRFRQIHUJHQHUDOMXULsdiction.188 In the majority of cases in which the court has expressly analyzed
JHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLWKDVIRXQGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVLQVXIILFLHQW189 In
the few instances in which general jurisdiction has been found, the defendant had a physical location, employees, and had designated an agent for service of process in the forum.190
Given that the Eighth Circuit already narrowly construes the scope of
general jurisdiction, Goodyear did little to change its analysis to date. Since
Goodyear, the court has had one opportunity in which to apply and interpret
Goodyear. In Viasystems v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Company, 191
Missouri-based Viasystems sued a German manufacturer of cooling fans, St.
Georgen, alleging several tort and contract claims based on apparent defects
in the fans.192 The district court dismissed the suit, finding that it lacked specific and general jurisdiction over St. Georgen, and Viasystems appealed.193
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that neither specific nor general jurisdiction supported an assertion of adjudicatory authority over St.
Georgen.194 7KHFRXUWUHMHFWHG9LDV\VWHPV¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI
6W*HRUJHQ¶VGLVWULEXWRUHEP-SDSVW ³(3,´ ZLWKLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHRI0Lssouri, subjected it to general jurisdiction.195 The court recited the test for
general jurisdiction directly from Goodyear, noting that the defendant must
have such continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state so as to

188. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 795 (8th Cir. 2010).
189. See Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int¶l, Inc., 607 F.3d 515, 519 (8th Cir. 2010);
Arden, 614 F.3d at 795; Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 956±57 (8th Cir. 2006); Epps
v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 650 (8th Cir. 2003); Guinness Imp. Co. v. Mark
VII Distribs. Inc., 153 F.3d 607, 614±15 (8th Cir. 1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples
Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996); H & W Wire Corp. v. Lone Star Wire, Inc.,
34 F.3d 1070, at*2 (8th Cir. 1994); Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819
(8th Cir. 1994).
190. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that
the Arkansas courts have general jurisdiction over Ohio-based Sherwin Williams because it
³conducts continuous business in Arkansas; it employs workers, owns and leases property,
and has designated an agent for service of process in the state.´).
191. 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2011).
192. Id. at 591±92.
193. Id. at 591±92.
194. Id. at 595, 598.
195. Id. at 595±98.
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PDNHLW³DWKRPH´WKHUH196 The court pointed to both Goodyear and Perkins
for the proposLWLRQWKDW³WKHSDUDGLJPIRUXPIRUWKHH[HUFLVHRIJHQHUDOMuULVGLFWLRQ>RYHUDQLQGLYLGXDO@LVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VGRPLFLOHIRUDFRUSRUDWLRQ
it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
KRPH´197
The court reasoned that SW*HRUJHQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVKHDGRIDGLVWULEXWLRQ
network that benefitted from the sales of its distributor in the forum state
could not confer general jurisdiction.198 While the court had recognized a
variant of stream-of-commerce theory, supporting jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer that pushes its products into a multi-state area through a distributor,199 it noted that precedent within the circuit limited such stream-ofcommerce inquiries to specific jurisdiction.200 As further support, the court
cited Goodyear, noting that the Supreme Court had similarly dismissed
VWUHDP RI FRPPHUFH DV ³[a] connection so limited between the forum and
the foreign corporation [that it] is an inadequate basis for the exercise of
JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´201 Finally, the court noted that the nine justices in
Goodyear KDG H[SUHVVO\ GLVDYRZHG D ³VSUDZOLQJ YLHZ RI JHQHUDO MXULVGLcWLRQ´WKDWZRXOGPDNHDQ\PDQXIDFWXUHUDPHQDEOHWRVXLWZKHUHYHULWVSURducts are distributed.202
196. Id. at 595 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011)).
197. Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 595 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853±54 and citing
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444±45 (1952)).
198. Id. at 597±98. Viasystems also argued that St. Georgen and EPI maintained either an
express or implied agency relationship, such that the in-state distributor EPI¶s actions could
be imputed to the principal St. Georgen, thereby conferring personal jurisdiction. Id. at 595±
96. The court rejected this argument on the facts, noting that EPI¶s scattered marketing statements on its website could not establish an express agency relationship simply because St.
Georgen owned and operated the website. Id. at 596. In addition, Viasystems also failed to
meet the standard for an implied agency relationship²namely that St. Georgen ³so controlled and dominated the affairs of the subsidiary that the latter¶s corporate existence was
disregarded so as to cause the residential corporation to act as the nonresidential corporate
defendant¶s alter ego.´ Id. (quoting Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 649
(8th Cir. 2003) and citing Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt.,
Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1975)). Essentially, Viasystems argued for general jurisdiction based on piercing the corporate veil of St. Georgen but failed to do so because it could
not establish the high degree of control and domination of the parent over its subsidiary. Id. at
596±97. ³St. Georgen did not create EPI, has no control or authority over EPI, and has no
directors or officers in common with EPI. The relationship between these two companies is
too attenuated to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen based on the
activities of EPI.´ Id. at 597.
199. Id. (citing Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
200. Id. (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851).
201. Id. (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856).
202. Id.
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From the foregoing, Goodyear merely serves as an affirmation of the
FRXUW¶V JHQHUDO-jurisdiction jurisprudence²namely, that it is reserved for
H[FHSWLRQDOFDVHV:KLOHWKH(LJKWK&LUFXLWGXWLIXOO\FLWHGWKH³DWKRPH´WHVW
from GoodyearLWGLGQRWSURPLQHQWO\IDFWRULQWKHFRXUW¶VDQDO\VLVRIJHneral jurisdiction, as LWQHYHUGLVFXVVHGWKHWHVW¶VPHDQLQJQRUGLGLWDQDO\]H
WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQGHUZKLFK6W*HRUJHQPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHG³DWKRPH´
LQ 0LVVRXUL ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH FRXUW GLVPLVVHG 9LDV\VWHPV¶ SULQFLSDO DUJument²WKDW6W*HRUJHQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK(3,VXEMHFWHd it to general jurisdiction²largely based on existing circuit precedent confining stream-ofcommerce theories to specific jurisdiction, which it deemed lacking in the
case. The court pointed to Goodyear merely as an affirmation of those prior
holdings in which it correctly distinguished between the two doctrines.
Similar to YanmarWKHFLUFXLWFRXUW¶VIDLOXUHWRPHDQLQJIXOO\LQWHUSUHW
DQGDSSO\³DWKRPH´LVLQSDUWDWWULEXWDEOHWRWKHWHVW¶VDPELJXLW\EXWDOVRD
UHIOHFWLRQ WKDW WKH FRXUW¶V H[LVWLQJ SUHFHGHnt narrowly construes general
jurisdiction. Viasystems presented scant evidence, never PLQG ³VXEVWDQWLDO
DQG FRQWLQXRXV´ HYLGHQFH RI 6W *HRUJHQ¶V WLHV WR WKH IRUXP VWDWH DVLGH
from the presence of its subsidiary. Even then, Viasystems only owned an
attenuated share of EPI²³a two-steps-removed 28±SHUFHQWLQWHUHVW´203 On
WKHVHIDFWVSURELQJWKHPHDQLQJRI³DWKRPH´ZDVVLPSO\XQQHFHVVDU\,nstead, the court only pointed to Goodyear as standing for the broad proposition that general jurisdiction is reserved for rare cases²a proposition conVLVWHQW ZLWK H[LVWLQJ FDVH ODZ 7KXV ZKDWHYHU WKH SUHFLVH PHDQLQJ RI ³DW
KRPH´ WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW DQG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW RI $UNDQVDV  KDYH Dpplied Goodyear to reaffirm that general jurisdiction is a high threshold to
overcome, and the case does not portend a significant shift in generaljurisdiction analysis. The court and practitioners will continue to use Perkins
and Helicopteros as general-jurisdiction guideposts.
C.

Stream-of-Commerce in the Eighth Circuit Before and After Nicastro

While the impact of Goodyear DQGLWV ³DW-KRPH´ WHVW RQ SUDFWLWLRQHUV
and courts within Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit is minimal, generaljurisdiction still remains a high threshold to overcome. As general jurisdiction may properly be reserved for exceptional cases, Arkansas practitioners
may necessarily come to rely more heavily on pleading specific jurisdiction
and stream-of-commerce in particular with regard to products liability. In so
doing, they will have to confront Nicastro and courts will have to assess its
precedential value.
Arkansas case law analyzing stream-of-commerce post-Asahi is scarce,
and Arkansas courts will presumably look to the Eighth Circuit for guid203. Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 597.
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ance. The Eighth Circuit has adopted an approach that holds foreign endproduct manufacturers subject to personal jurisdiction based on their use of
expansive distribution schemes that target the American market as a whole
but no one state in particular.204 Such an approach is in direct conflict with
the plurality opinion in Nicastro.
Despite the conflict, this section concludes that the Eighth Circuit need
not and should not change course. After briefly discussing the Eighth CirFXLW¶V FXUUHQW VWUHDP-of-commerce approach,205 this section analyzes other
MXULVGLFWLRQV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI Nicastro to date, noting that an emerging
majority has tempered its precedential value and continue to apply preNicastro stream-of-commerce approaches.206 By following the reasoning of
these courts, the Eighth Circuit can continue to exert personal jurisdiction
over foreign manufacturers at the head of distribution networks. Moreover,
as this section concludes, the court should continue to adhere to its existing
approach, as it best comports with realities of modern commerce while remaining faithful to principles underlying specific-jurisdiction doctrine.
1.

7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V&XUUHQW6WUHDP-of-Commerce Approach

In the wake of Asahi, the Eighth Circuit adopted and adhered to Justice
2¶&RQQRU¶VVWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test, requiring some additional showing that the non-resident defendant purposely targeted the forum state in
order to support personal jurisdiction.207 In Barone v. Rich Brothers Interstate Display Fireworks Company,208 however, the Eighth Circuit departed
from precedent and adopted a more relaxed, stream-of-commerce approach.
In Barone, the Nebraska-based plaintiff, Bernard Barone, sued both
Hosoya Fireworks Company, a Japanese manufacturer of fireworks, and its
South Dakota-based distributor, Rich Brothers Interstate Display Fireworks
Company, for injuries he suffered when a Fourth of July fireworks display
he had arranged went awry.209 The Nebraska District Court dismissed the
suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that Hosoya could properly be haled into court in Nebraska consistent with
due process.210 At the outset, the court noted that Hosoya had no physical
204. See infra Part III.C.1.
205. See infra Part III.C.1.
206. See infra Part III.D.
207. See Timothy C. Lynch, Roman Candles and Bottle Rockets: The Eighth Circuit
Blows Up the ³Stream of Commerce Plus´ Analysis in Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, Inc., 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1371, 1405 (1996) (describing cases in which the
Eighth Circuit applied the more exacting stream-of-commerce-plus test).
208. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir.
1994).
209. Id. at 610±11.
210. Id. at 615.
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presence in Nebraska, no registered agent, no subsidiary, and it neither advertised nor sold its products directly in the forum state.211 Nonetheless, the
SURFHVVE\ZKLFK+RVR\D¶VILUHZRUNVFDPHLQWR1HEUDVNDVXIILFHGWRFRQIHU
personal jurisdiction. 212
In the years preceding the accident that injured Mr. Barone, Hosoya
engaged nine different distributors in six states to sell its products within the
United States.213 Combined, the nine American distributors comprised an
average of seventy perceQWRI+RVR\D¶VILUHZRUNVEXVLQHVVDQGGLGVRHIIHctively throughout the country.214 The South Dakota-based distributor, Rich
Bros., purchased an average of $100,000 annually from Hosoya and approximately sixteen percent of those fireworks made their way to Nebraska every
year.215 Based on these facts, the court concluded that Hosoya employed a
select number of strategically located distributors to reach as much of the
FRXQWU\DVSRVVLEOH$VVXFKWKHFRXUWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW³+RVR\DUHDSHG
the benefits of its network of distributors, and it is only reasonable and just
WKDWLWVKRXOGQRZEHKHOGDFFRXQWDEOHLQWKHIRUXPRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VFKRLFH
´216
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Clune v. Alimak
AB.217 In Clune, the court reversed a loZHUFRXUW¶VILQGLQJWKDW$OLPDN$%D
Swedish corporation that designed and manufactured construction hoists,
lacked sufficient minimum contacts necessary to confer specific jurisdiction.218 Alimak maintained exclusive distribution agreements with American
distributors; in fact, an American consumer could only purchase a construction hoist through the American distributors.219 Between 20 and 40 of the
700 hoists sold in the United States ended up in the forum state of Missouri.220 Based on the facts, the court deHPHG$OLPDN¶VFRQWDFWVVXIILFLHQWO\
purposeful even though it did not target Missouri particularly.221 The fact
that it used two distributors to sell its products to every state sufficed for the
court to confer jurisdiction.222

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 611.
Id. at 613±14.
Id. at 611.
Barone, 25 F.3d at 611.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 543±44.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id.
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Other Jurisdictions Have Limited the Precedential Impact of Nicastro

As both Clune and Barone GHPRQVWUDWH WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V DSSOLFation of stream-of-commerce theory is at odds with the plurality in Nicastro.
While the Eighth Circuit has not confronted the impact of Nicastro yet, other jurisdictions have and have concluded that it has done little to change
existing precedent.
At least one jurisdiction has summarily asserted that Nicastro is limited
to its facts.223 Others have similarly limited its impact by distinguishing the
facts necessary to support a finding of sufficient contacts.224 These jurisdictions have noted that J. McIntyre only had three contacts with New Jersey:
the relationship with the independent U.S. distributor to market its products;
the regular attendance of company executives at conventions held in America but none in New Jersey; and the four machines that found their way into
the forum state.225 Thus, courts have upheld the assertion of specific jurisdiction where the facts evinced more substantial sales made within the forum

223. See Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL
6291812, at *2, *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011), aff¶d sub. nom. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng¶g,
Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that ³Justice Breyer¶s . . . [Nicastro] opinion
was only applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario as that case,´ and asserting
that . . . ³[Nicastro] has little to no precedential value.´).
224. See Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT¶L L. 417, 427±28
(2012) (collecting cases that have analyzed Nicastro).
225. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).

256

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

state226 and where the defendant used a distribution chain that directly targeted a forum state for sales of its products.227
A majority of courts, however, have resolved Nicastro based on a procedural rule²the Marks rule. According to the Marks rule³>Z@KHQDIUDgmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
HQMR\VWKHDVVHQWRIILYH-XVWLFHVµWKHKROGLQJRIWKH&RXUWPD\EHYLHZHG
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds.¶´228 Applying this rule, a growing number of jurisGLFWLRQVKDYHGHHPHG-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRQFXUUHQFHDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH
narrowest grounds supporting the holding.229 As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained:
[T]he crux RI-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRQFXUUHQFHZDVWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
framework applying the stream-of-commerce theory²including the conflicting articulations of that theory in Asahi²had not changed, and that
WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ 0F,QW\UH IDLOHG WR establish personal jurisdiction under any articulation of that theory. Because McIntyre did not
produce a majority opinion, we must [apply the Marks rule and] follow
226. See, e.g., King v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 5:11-CV-2269-AKK, 2012 WL 1340066,
at *7 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2012) (asserting specific jurisdiction because ³>u]nlike the manufacturer in . . . [Nicastro] who utilized an independent U.S. distributor that merely distributed
four machines to the state of New Jersey, GM Canada utilized its parent corporation to distribute hundreds, if not thousands, of vehicles to the state of Alabama, including the vehicle
at issue.´); Russell v. SNFA, No. 1-09-3012, 2011 WL 6965795, at *8 (Ill. App. Dec. 16,
2011) (noting that ³approximately 2,198´ of the defendant¶s parts had been sold in Illinois
between 2000 and 2007 and ³[t]hus, insufficient sales is not an issue in the case before us, as
it was in . . . [Nicastro].´); Graham v. Hamilton, No. 3:11-609, 2012 WL 893748, at *4
(W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2012) (distinguishing the one machine that ended up in New Jersey in
Nicastro with ³. . . evidence demonstrating that GM Canada places over 800,000 vehicles
into the U.S. market each year, indicating that many of GM Canada¶s vehicles would likely
be sold in Louisiana.´); Dierig v. Lees Leisure Indus., Ltd., No. 11-125-DLB-JGW, 2012 WL
669968, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2012) (upholding specific jurisdiction, noting that ³in
contrast . . . [to Nicastro], the facts here demonstrate that Defendant Lees Leisure has advertised in, sent goods to, and targeted the Commonwealth of Kentucky in efforts to market and
sell its products.´); Merced v. Gemstar Grp., Inc., No. 10-3054, 2011 WL 5865964, at *5 n.1
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011) (finding Nicastro factually dissimilar because there ³the defendant
never made a single shipment to the forum state,´ but ³[i]n the present case, the Margraf
[d]efendants have made at least three-including the one giving rise to this litigation.´).
227. See, e.g., Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (³In contrast [to . . . Nicastro], Life+Gear has sold its products to two distributors that market to Illinois residents . . . The distribution network Life+Gear has utilized
within Illinois is far afield from Justice Kennedy¶s example of the owner of the small farm
who has no control over distribution channels for her crops.´).
228. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
229. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffet Eng¶g, Ltd. 716 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2013);
AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Willemsen
v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 873 (Or. 2012) (en banc).
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the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case. The narrowest holding is WKDWZKLFKFDQEHGLVWLOOHGIURP-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRncurrence²that the law remains the same after McIntyre.230

Following this trend, a growing number of other jurisdictions have employed similar reasoning, concluding that their pre-Nicastro stream-ofcommerce jurisprudence remains binding.231 Indeed, at least one district
FRXUW ZLWKLQ WKH FLUFXLW KDV DOUHDG\ GHWHUPLQHG WKDW ³>Nicastro] did not
FKDQJHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN´QHFHVVLWDWLQJDSSOiFDWLRQRI³(LJKWK&LUFXLWFDVHODZLQWHUSUHWLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VH[LVWLQJ
stream of FRPPHUFHSUHFHGHQW´232
E.

The Eighth Circuit Should Adhere to Its Pre-Nicastro Stream-ofCommerce Jurisprudence

The Eighth Circuit should follow the trend among other jurisdictions
that continue to apply their pre-Nicastro approach to stream-of-commerce
theory for two primary reasons. First, it better reflects the realities of modern global commerce. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Nicastro dissent, the
³FDVHLVLOOXVWUDWLYHRIPDUNHWLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUVDOHVLQWhe United States

230. AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted).
231. See, e.g., id. (³Because [Nicastro] did not produce a majority opinion, we must follow the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case. The narrowest holding is
that which can be distilled from Justice Breyer¶s concurrence²that the law remains the same
after . . . [Nicastro].´ (citations omitted)); In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab.
Litig., 894 F. Supp. 2d 819, 849 (E.D. La. 2012) (³Justice Breyer¶s concurrence, the governing decision, expressly requires the application of existing Supreme Court precedent on specific personal jurisdiction, leaving unaltered the . . . [pre-Nicastro] jurisprudence relied upon
by the Fifth Circuit. Thus, the Court applies the Fifth Circuit¶s law as informed by Supreme
Court precedent on specific personal jurisdiction and the stream-of-commerce doctrine.´);
Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D. Md.), as amended (Dec. 15,
2011) (³This Court therefore construes [Nicastro] as rejecting the foreseeability standard of
personal jurisdiction, but otherwise leaving the legal landscape untouched. The Court will
therefore return to this circuit¶s post-Asahi precedents to resolve this case.´); Frito-Lay N.
Am., Inc. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (invoking the
Marks rule to hold that ³Justice Breyer¶s concurrence is the controlling opinion of the Supreme Court´ and that ³Justice Breyer specifically declined to announce a new rule in stream
of commerce cases.´); Eskridge v. Pac. Cycle, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00615, 2012 WL 1036826,
at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 27, 2012) (³Because Nicastro did not produce a majority opinion
adopting either Justice O¶Connor¶s or Justice Brennan¶s stream of commerce theory, and
given Justice Breyer¶s reliance on current Supreme Court precedent, post-Asahi Fourth Circuit case law remains binding.´) (citing Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632,
638 (D. Md. 2011)).
232. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Steris Corp., No. 11-CV-00078 (SRN/AJB), 2012 WL 5187790, at
*6 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2012).
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FRPPRQ LQ WRGD\¶V FRPPHUFLDO ZRUOG´233 Indeed, foreign end-product
manufacturers regularly employ American distributors for practical, economic, and cultural reasons.234 The Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶V VXJJHVWHG IUDPework, however, fails to account for this fact. Worse, it permits a foreign
manufacturer to easily escape personal jurisdiction based on it. Indeed, to
avoid the jurisdiction of the American courts, an informed lawyer need only
provide a few words of advice to its foreign client: first, design and produce
the product for no particular state market; second, do not make direct sales;
third, hire an independent domestic distributor to sell within the entirety of
the United States as opposed to a particular state. If the Nicastro plurality
controlled and the client followed this advice, there is a good chance it could
avoid jurisdiction. As a result, there is also a built-in disincentive to target a
discrete state, as under the Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶V IUDPHZRUN WKH HQWLW\ FDQ
maximize its market penetration while avoiding the cost of litigation.
The Court has emphasized that its specific jurisprudence must evolve
contemporaneously with commercial practices.235 7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VGHFision in Barone represents such an evolution. The Barone court reasoned that
³>L@QWKLVDJHRI1$)7$DQG*$77RQHFDQH[SHFWIXUWKHUJOREDOL]DWLRQRI
commerce, and it is only reasonable for companies that distribute allegedly
defective products through regional distributors in this country to anticipate
being haled into FRXUWE\SODLQWLIIVLQWKHLUKRPHVWDWHV´236 Because foreign
manufacturers can and do maximize their sales by treating the U.S. market
as whole, without targeting a particular state, personal jurisdiction cannot be
predicated on an outmoded conception of commercial practices.
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH IRUHJRLQJ WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V DSSURDFK EHVW FRmports with purposeful availment. As discussed previously, personal jurisdiction requires a finding that the defendant deliberately committed an act to
avail itself of the market in the forum state. Thus, the purposeful availment
requirement entails more than foreseeability, it necessitates a degree of intent and control. When a foreign manufacturer selects, organizes, and uses a
network of American-based distributors to sell its products across the country, to every state but no state in particular, logic dictates that it intends to
avail itself of the forums in which its product actually enter.
233. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2799 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
234. Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution-Beyond the
Distribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL¶Y INT¶L BUS. 839, 871 (1994).
235. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292±93 (1980);
(citing McGee v. Int¶l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)); McGee, 355 U.S. at 222 (1957)
(³Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years.´).
236. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (1994).
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7KH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V H[LVWLQJ SUHFHGHQW UHIOHFWV WKLV ORJLF ,Q Barone,
the defendant Hosoya argued that it did not intend or know that its products
ZRXOGUHDFK1HEUDVNDGHVSLWHWKHVWDWH¶VFORVHSUR[LPLW\WRWKH6RXWK'akota distributor.237 7KHFRXUWGLVPLVVHG+RVR\D¶VLJQRUDQFHGHIHQVH,WQRWHG
that the South Dakota-distributor ZDV³FRQYHQLHQWO\ORFDWHG´FORVHWRWKUHH
other states, including Nebraska.238 In addition, the court noted that each of
+RVR\D¶VGLVWULEXWRUVZDVVWUDWHJLFDOO\ORFDWHGWRUHDFKQXPHURXVVWDWHVDQG
their locations were unlikely the result of mere chance.239 Instead, the court
FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ VFKHPH FRQVWLWXWHG ³HYLGHQFH RI +RVR\D¶V
efforts to place its products in the stream of commerce throughout the MidZHVWDQGRWKHUSDUWVRIWKHFRXQWU\DVZHOO´240 Thus, it was not only foreseeable to Hosoya that its South Dakota distributor would penetrate neighboring Nebraska with its fireworks, it was purposeful and planned.
More pointedly, in Clune, the court concluded the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state by virtue of the distribution network it
set up to sell construction hoists across the country.241 Through that distribution network, the court concluded that the manufacturer both knew and inWHQGHG LWV SURGXFW WR HQWHU WKH IRUXP VWDWH GHVSLWH WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DUJuments to the contrary: ³,I ZH ZHUH WR FRQFOXGHWKDWGHVSLWH LWVGLVWULEXWLRQ
system, [the defendant] did not intend its products to flow into [the forum
state], we would be bound to the conclusion that the company did not intend
its products to flow into any of the United SWDWHV´242 Thus, logic dictates
that purposeful availment is satisfied when a manufacturer sells its products
through a distribution network that targets sales in every state.
,Q DGGLWLRQ XQGHU WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V FXUUHQW IUDPHZRUN D IRUHLJQ
manufacturer utilizing a domestic distribution network can easily take steps
to avoid availing itself of the forum market, thereby avoiding jurisdiction. In
Barone, the court noted that a foreign manufacturer that selects a discrete
few distributors for the purpose of selling in specific states but not others
may limit its exposure to adjudicatory authority. 243 To do this, a manufacturer need only make it a condition of the distribution agreement that the
distributors not market to specific states.244 Further, it could require indemnification for the distributors.245 Such evidence that the manufacturer affirm237. Id. at 613.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 614.
241. Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 544±45 (8th Cir. 2000).
242. Id. at 544.
243. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (1994).
244. Noyes, supra note 142, at 92.
245. Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163,
1167±68 (2013).
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atively sought to prevent the distribution of its products from entering the
forum state would militate against exercising specific jurisdiction based on
the absence of purposeful availment.246 By the same token, evidence that the
manufacturer could have but did not restrict its sales should satisfy purposeful availment.247
Finally, fairness and reciprocity principles require holding foreign
manufacturers at the head of domestic distribution chains subject to personal
jurisdiction in those states in which its product injures consumers. Emanating from International ShoeWKH&RXUW¶VVSHFLILFMXULVGLFWLRQMXULVSUXGHQFH
has long emphasized fundamental fairness:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations;
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which [sic] requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.248

The foregoing embodies a quid pro quo: in return for the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state, the entity subjects itself to the state
FRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ 7KXV SHUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV SURSHU ZKHQ WKH HQWLW\
benefits from its deliberate contacts with the forum state. Unlike the
Nicastro pluraOLW\ WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V DSSURDFK UHPDLQV IDLWKIXO WR WKLV
principle. Not only does it recognize that sellers at the top of distribution
FKDLQV UHDS WKH EHQHILW RI HDFK VWDWH¶V ODZV LW UHFRJQL]HV WKDW WKH\ HQMR\
³WKHPXFKJUHDWHUHFRQRPLFEHQHILWRIPXOWLSOHVDOHVLQGLVWDQWIRUXPV´249
Because distribution chains allow foreign manufacturers to maximize their
profits and market penetration, fairness mandates that they submit to personal jurisdiction in the forum where their product causes injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer left open the possibility that the Court might refashion
its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in light of modern commercial concerns in an appropriate case in the future,250 and commentators have
246. Clune, 233 F.3d at 544.
247. Noyes, supra note 142, at 99.
248. Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
249. Clune, 233 F.3d at 543 (citing Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks
Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1994)).
250. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (³At a minimum, I would not work such a change to the law in the way either the
plurality or the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests without a better understanding of the
relevant contemporary commercial circumstances. Insofar as such considerations are relevant
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acknowledged the possibility of both state and federal legislation to accomplish this purpose.251
For the time being, however, Arkansas practitioners and courts are left
to grapple with the still muddied state of personal jurisdiction landscape.
Although the Goodyear Court spoke with a unanimous voice, the case in
HIIHFWDGGVOLWWOHWRWKHGHDUWKRIDXWKRULW\7KHDPELJXRXV³DW-KRPH´VWDQdard has limited its utility and neither the Supreme Court of Arkansas nor the
Eighth Circuit has shifted its approach regarding general jurisdiction in the
wake of Goodyear. Instead, the courts continue to use Perkins and
Helicopteros, as well as their own precedent, to assess whether general jurisdiction is appropriate. In this sense, Goodyear is simply an affirmation of
the narrow scope of general jurisdiction.
Given the limitations of general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, especially stream-of-commerce theory, takes on renewed importance for Arkansas practitioners seeking personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
While Nicastro arguably curtailed the contours of specific jurisdiction, a
number of lower courts have subsequently disregarded or distinguished its
precedential value. As a result, many of those jurisdictions have adhered to
their pre-Nicastro stream-of-commerce precedents. Without clear and contrary direction from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit should follow
this trend and continue to hold foreign manufacturers at the top of distribution chains subject to personal jurisdiction when their defective products
purposefully and regularly flow into a forum state and cause injury to consumers there. To hold otherwise would not only ignore the reality of modern
commercial practices, it would unfairly permit foreign defendants to escape
the adjudicatory authority of the courts and, in turn, accountability to American consumers.
Kathy McCarroll*

to any change in present law, they might be presented in a case (unlike the present one) . . .
´).
251. See Hoffheimer, supra note 183, at 605±09 (discussing the possibility of state or
federal legislation confronting personal jurisdiction over foreign entities); see also Foreign
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act, S.1606, 111th Cong. (2009), http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s1606is/pdf/BILLS-111s1606is.pdf (Senate bill addressing personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers); Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act,
H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3646ih/pdf/
BILLS-112hr3646ih.pdf (House bill addressing personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers).
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